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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-The United States
Supreme Court held that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution due to
clerical errors by court employees.
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
In January of 1991, a Phoenix police officer stopped Isaac
Evans ("Evans") for driving the wrong way on a one-way street.1
After discovering that Evans' driver's license had been
suspended, the officer checked Evans' information on a computer
terminal in the police car.2 The computer data not only
confirmed the suspended license, but also indicated several
outstanding misdemeanor warrants for Evans' arrest.3 Because
of the warrants, the officer placed Evans under arrest.4 The
officer then discovered, while placing handcuffs on Evans, that
Evans had dropped what looked like a hand-rolled cigarette.5
Upon examination of the cigarette, the officer noticed a scent of
marijuana.6 The officer searched the car and found a bag of
marijuana under the car seat.7 Evans was subsequently
arrested and charged with possession.8
After Evans' arrest, the trial court discovered that the
warrants for his outstanding misdemeanors had been quashed,9
1. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1188 (1995).
2. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
3. Id. The misdemeanor warrants were issued for failure to appear to answer
several traffic violations. Id. Misdemeanor is defined as "[o]ffenses lower than felo-
nies and generally those punishable by fine, penalty, forfeiture or imprisonment
otherwise than in penitentiary." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 999 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1187.
8. Id. Under Arizona law, possession is defined as the voluntary act of a de-
fendant knowingly exercising dominion or control over property. ARIZONA REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-105 (1990).
9. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188. To quash means to annul or to make void.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990). On December 13, 1990, the court
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and hence invalid.'" Evans argued that the marijuana
discovered in his car should be suppressed because a judge had
quashed the misdemeanor warrants seventeen days before."
Evans also argued that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule' did not apply because it was not a police
error, but rather a judicial error that caused the mistake. 3 The
Chief Clerk of the Justice Court testified at the suppression
hearing that there was no record of any court official placing any
quashed warrants on file nor that anyone from the clerk's office
had contacted the Sheriffs Office to indicate that such a motion
had been completed.'4
The Superior Court, Maricopa County, granted Evans' motion
to suppress. 5 The court based its decision on the presumption
that the state was at fault. 6 The court determined that there
existed no distinction between actions of the police and those of
the court, and both would constitute state action.17
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
exclusionary rule was not intended to be a deterring factor in
the routines of court employees.'" The Arizona Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals. 9 The supreme
court disagreed with the distinctions between those "directly"
and those "indirectly" involved in the law enforcement
process.2" The court suggested that the purpose behind such a
issued an arrest warrant for Evans because he had failed to appear to answer for
several traffic violations. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188. Six days later a pro tern Justice
of the Peace quashed the warrant after Evans appeared before him. Id.
10. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
11. Id.
12. Id. The "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule provides that evi-
dence should not be suppressed when officers were acting in good faith and could
not reasonably determine that a mistake had been made. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
564 (6th ed. 1990). Officers may also reasonably rely on a magistrate's determination
of probable cause. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
13. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188. The procedure of quashing a warrant begins
with the Justice Court Clerk informing the warrant department in the Sheriffs Of-
fice when a warrant has been quashed. Id. The individual's name and the Sheriffs
Office representative's name should then be recorded. Id. The Sheriffs Office must





18. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866
P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995). The Arizona Court of Ap-
peals specifically looked to the purpose of the exclusionary rule and determined that
the purpose was to deter those directly associated with the arrest itself. Evans, 836
P.2d at 1027.
19. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185
(1995).
20. Evans, 866 P.2d at 871-72. A part of the rationale used by the court was
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holding was to enhance the efficiency of the responsible
departments and directly punish those departments for any
incompetence. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should apply to evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment2 due to clerical
errors of state court employees. 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority," first
discussed the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction.25 The
Court looked to Michigan v. Long,2" in which the Court held
that it would take jurisdiction over state court decisions
rendered without a "plain statement" regarding "an independent
and adequate state ground." 7 The Court proposed that the
threat of taking jurisdiction over state court decisions would
encourage state courts to develop distinct state constitutional
jurisprudence, thus preserving the integrity of federal law.28
The Court, adhering to the standards developed in Long,
concluded that it had jurisdiction because the Arizona Supreme
Court's decision was based on an interpretation of federal law.29
that there was no distinction between clerical errors made by court clerks and those
made by law enforcement officers. Id.
21. Id. at 872. The Arizona Supreme Court suggested, contrary to the court of
appeals, that such a holding would serve a specific purpose and would affect the
outcome of a court clerk's performance. Id.
22. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
23. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189.
24. Id. at 1187. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the majority
opinion. Id.
25. Id. at 1189. Evans argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 due to the fact that the Arizona Supreme Court based its
decision on a state statute and not the Fourth Amendment issue. Id. The statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1257, allows final judgments of a state's supreme court to be reviewed by
the United States Supreme Court where the validity of a state statute is drawn into
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the United States Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1988).
26. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
27. Long, 463 U.S. at 1032-33. The standards were based upon whether the
state court decision rested primarily on federal law or was to be "interwoven" with
federal liw to the point that any independent state grounds appeared ambiguous,
and therefore, application of federal law would be the most plausible solution. Id. at
1040-41.
28. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1041).
29. Id. at 1190 (citing Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557
(1940)). The Court discussed the fundamental rights of states to be free to interpret
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In order to determine whether the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied to the suppressed evidence in Evans,
the Court used a three-part test first developed in United States
v Leon.3" The Leon three-part analysis was used in the context
of police searches to determine whether the police had
reasonably relied on a warrant, later found to have been
invalid."' First, the Court looked to the historical purpose of the
exclusionary rule, which was the prevention of misconduct of
police, not judges.32 Second, the Court found no incentives for a
detached judge or magistrate to subvert any Fourth Amendment
rights.33 Finally, the Court found that there existed no factual
basis in believing that the exclusionary rule would have a
significant deterrent effect on judicial action.34 In following this
reasoning, the Court suggested that. the application of the
exclusionary rule in a situation caused by an erroneous
computer error by a court employee would have no deterrent
effect on the performance of employees responsible for recording
quashed warrants.35 The Court reasoned that the employees
had no stake in the result of any particular prosecutions and
that they were not directly engaged in the daily activities of law
enforcement. 6 The Court also determined that it was relevant
to consider the ramifications for police officers who might alter
their routine behavior for fear of unknown court clerical
errors.
37
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion,3 discussed the
overwhelming benefits that technology brings to the realm of
law enforcement.39 Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority
the Constitution. Id. The Court also stated that such rights should not be barriers
to the Supreme Court in obscure or ambiguous state court decisions. Id. The Court
reaffirmed its authority as the final adjudicator. Id.
30. Id. at 1190. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
31. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Court in Leon applied a three-part analysis in
determining the applicability of the eitclusionary rule as a means of deterring mis-
conduct on the part of judicial officers issuing warrants. Id. at 916. See Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987) (analyzing Leon).
32. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1189.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1193.
35. Id. at 1192.
36. Id. at 1193.
37. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540
(1976). The Court in Stone suggested that excluding evidence can only affect an
officer's future conduct in a way that will make him less willing to perform his
duties. Stone, 428 U.S. at 540.
38. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Souter and
Breyer joined in a separate concurrence. Id. at 1194.
39. Id. at 1195. Some of these benefits were the advanced computer based
record keeping systems that aided in the facilitation of arrests and other computer
234 Vol. 34:231
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that the exclusionary rule imposes significant costs on society
and should be applied prudently, but suggested that law
enforcement officers must not act blindly in their reliance on
new technology."0 Justice O'Connor suggested that the benefits
reaped by new technology carry with them a paralleling
constitutional burden.4 Justice Souter, with whom Justice
Breyer joined in concurring, agreed with Justice O'Connor, yet
added that the Court should not answer evidentiary questions
regarding evolving technological changes that might soon be a
part of contemporary lifestyles.4'
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, addressed several of
the issues raised by the majority.43 First, Justice Stevens stated
that a writ of certiorari should not have been granted because of
a lack of jurisdiction." Justice Stevens then commented on the
retributive effect of not applying the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule which, in essence, would prohibit states from
profiting from negligent conduct and would cause states to train
their employees to be more efficient and precise.4" Finally,
Justice Stevens argued that the Court's reliance on Leon was
inapplicable." In Leon, Justice Stevens reasoned, it was the
validity of the warrant that was at issue and not, as in this case,
the mere existence of a warrant.47
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joined, argued
that by applying Long to find proper jurisdiction, the Court
failed to use the lower court system as a legal thermometer in
testing contemporary legal issues." Justice Ginsburg suggested
that the Court erred in its presumption that the Arizona
aided law enforcement mechanisms that made for more efficient use of time. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
43. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Id. Justice Stevens joined Justice Ginsburg's dissent in arguing that the
Court departed from its settled law in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), as to
the jurisdictional issue. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens suggested that the Court should apply the assumption that the Arizona
Supreme Court ruled under its own state constitutional principles barring any un-
warranted violations of individual rights, thereby insulating the decision from review.
Id.
45. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195
46. Id. at 1196.
47. Id. at 1198. Part of Justice Stevens' reasoning was that the non-existence
of the warrant was due to clerical errors of employees who had no more regular or
direct contact with police than with the magistrates or judges who issue the war-
rants. Id.
48. Id. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that Arizo-
na's Supreme Court may validly rule for its people under its own state constitution
on this issue. Id.
1995
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Supreme Court based its decision on federal law and that
therefore, federal jurisdiction had not been established.49 For
this reason, Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court should have
denied the writ of certiorari. °
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created theory that
requires the suppression of evidence as a remedy for violations
of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.51 In Weeks v.
United States,52 the Court held that illegally seized evidence
could not be introduced in federal prosecutions. 3 The issue of
whether this doctrine was applicable in state criminal
prosecutions through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment54 was addressed in Wolf v. Colorado." The Wolf
Court declined to extend the Weeks rationale to state criminal
proceedings." Wolfs holding was repudiated in Mapp v.
Ohio,7 in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against the admission of illegally obtained evidence
was applicable in state prosecutions. 8
The Supreme Court has identified four exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.59 First, evidence obtained when police act in
good faith reliance on a warrant will not be excluded." Second,
evidence with only a slight connection to the illegal conduct will
not be excluded."' The third exception is invoked when the
49. Id.
50. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1203.
51. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). For historical background on
the exclusionary rule, see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond:
The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).
52. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. The Court reasoned that if the fruits of an un-
reasonable search were introduced at trial, "the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring [the defendant's] right to be secure against such searches and seizures
[would be] of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as
well be stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393.
54. The Due Process Clause provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
55. 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
56. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33. The Court held "that in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id.
57. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. The Court held "that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court." Id.
59. See Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 GEo. L. J. 939, 1096 (1993).
60. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 920 (1984).
61. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). In Wong
Vol. 34:231
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challenged evidence is discovered through a source that is
independent of the illegal activity. 2 Finally, evidence that
would have inevitably been found by a lawful means is not
excluded.63
Central to the Court's holding in Evans was the good faith
exception to exclusionary rule, first created in United States v.
Leon." In Leon, the issue was whether the exclusionary rule
should apply to the admissibility of evidence discovered by police
officers acting in good faith reliance on a search warrant
ultimately found to be lacking probable cause but issued by a
neutral magistrate.65 The Supreme Court reversed and held
that evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on an invalid
search warrant was admissible.66
The Leon Court stressed that the exclusionary rule was
designed to deter police misconduct and not to punish judges or
magistrates." The Court found that no evidence existed that
showed a motive or purpose for a neutral judge or magistrate to
purposely violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.6"
Sun, the defendant had been arrested without probable cause but later returned
voluntarily to give an unsigned confession. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491, 476-77. The
Court held that the means for obtaining the confession was not causally linked to
the illegal arrest. Id. at 488.
62. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
63. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 434 (1984). In Nix, the discovery of a
murder victim's body was held admissible, even though the statements procuring the
information as to the body's location were obtained in violation of the Constitution,
because a general search of the area would have discovered the body. Nix, 467 U.S.
at 434.
64. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
65. Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. In 1981, a confidential informant notified the
Burbank Police Department that a large quantity of cocaine and methaqualone was
being sold from a Burbank residence. Id. In an extensive investigation, police identi-
fied the owner of the residence and the driver of the car that continually visited the
residence and each time left with a small package. Id. The police found that Ricardo
Del Castillo ("Del Castillo") owned the car in question and that Del Castillo had a
prior arrest record. Id. A check of Del Castillo's probation records led officers to
Alberto Leon ("Leon"), who was listed as Del Castillo's employer. Id. Prior to the
investigation, Burbank Police obtained information from a Glendale Police Officer
who learned from an informant that Leon stored large quantities of methaqualone at
his residence in Glendale. Id. Based on these facts and other observations, the mag-
istrate issued Officer Cyril Rombach a facially valid search warrant. Id. at 902.
During the searches of the residence and automobiles, the police confiscated varying
amounts of drugs and the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to possess and
distribute cocaine. Id. The district court granted motions to suppress and found that
the warrants lacked probable cause. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's decision, holding that affidavits that suggested criminal activity
were not sufficient for probable cause. Id.
66. Id. at 901.
67. Id. at 916.
68. Id. at 917. The Court suggested that the application of the exclusionary
rule served no purpose in deterring improper conduct of judges or magistrates since
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The Court discussed the validity of a good faith claim by
suggesting that the judgment of a detached and neutral
magistrate was significantly more reliable in safeguarding a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against improper
searches and seizures than a police officer who had a significant
stake in the outcome of searches and seizures." The Court also
suggested that reasonable minds might differ as to what
constitutes probable cause in a particular situation; therefore,
great deference should be given to a magistrate's
determination.0
Another consequence of the exclusionary rule that the Leon
Court considered was a cost-benefit analysis which weighed the
cost of losing valuable evidence needed in the prosecution of
defendants against the benefit of deterring Fourth Amendment
violations.7 The Court concluded that the costs of the rule were
two-sided because by disallowing certain evidence, the rule
impeded the truth-finding process.72 The Court also noted that
indiscriminate application of the rule generates disrespect for
the law and the justice system.73
In a companion case to Leon, Massachusetts v. Sheppard,74
the Court addressed the issue of whether the exclusionary rule
applies to evidence discovered by police officers acting in good
faith reliance on a facially deficient warrant." The Court
applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and
allowed evidence seized from the facially deficient warrant to be
presented in court.76
While gathering evidence in a murder investigation, police
drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant application
these officials are generally detached from the direct crime fighting process. Id.
69. Id.
70. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
71. Id. at 908. The Court articulated concerns regarding the inevitable conse-
quences of the rule in which the defendant may go free or get a reduced sentence.
Id. Such consequences the Court noted will inevitably offend the purpose and basic
objective of the criminal justice system. Id.
72. Id. at 907.
73. Id. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 490 (1976) (holding that a state
prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evi-
dence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at trial
when a state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth
Amendment claim).
74. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
75. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988.
76. Id. at 984. The warrant at issue in Sheppard failed to specify the items
that the search sought to uncover. Id. at 987. In contrast, the Leon warrant, while
facially valid, was not supported by probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902-03.
Vol. 34:231
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requesting authorization to search the defendant's residence.77
Because it was Sunday and the courts were closed, the police
took another municipality's controlled substance application and
made certain changes.7" A judge subsequently authorized the
application after further revision. 9 Even after subsequent
judicial revision and authorization, the warrant was found to be
substantively deficient, but the Court adhered to the principles
set forth in Leon and refused to exclude the evidence.8"
The good faith exception was again considered in Illinois v.
Krull.1 Krull presented the question of whether an exception to
the exclusionary rule should be recognized when a police officer
reasonably relied on a statute authorizing warrantless searches
which was later found to be in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.82 The Court held that the exclusionary rule did
not apply to evidence seized by police acting in an objectively
reasonable manner on an unconstitutional statute. 83 The Court
reasoned that the suppression of evidence found by a police
officer acting in an objectively reasonable reliance on an
unconstitutional statute had little deterrent effect on a judge or
magistrate.' The Court found it unreasonable to suggest that
judges and magistrates were inclined to subvert or ignore
Fourth Amendments rights.85 The Court held that unless a
statute was clearly unconstitutional, it was unreasonable to
expect a police officer to accurately determine the
constitutionality of the statute.88
The Court then considered the factual difference between
Leon and Krull: the effect of the exclusion of evidence on
77. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988.
78. Id. at 985.
79. Id. at 986. The judge concluded from the affidavits that probable cause
existed and that changes would be made to the warrant, yet the changes made by
the judge did not change the substantive portion of the warrant. Id.
80. Id. at 987-88.
81. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
82. Krull, 480 U.S. at 342. Krull is contrasted with Leon in that, in Leon, the
Court considered the reliance on a warrant whereas in Krull, the Court considered
reliance on an unconstitutional statute. Id. The statute in question permits state
officials to examine the premises of automotive parts dealers to determine the ac-
curacy of their state mandated records. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2 %T 5-100 to 5-801
(1985).
83. Krul, 480 U.S. at 346, 361. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).





judicial officers as opposed to legislators. 7 As stated in Leon,
one of the initial purposes of the exclusionary rule was to deter
police misconduct, not judicial officers' misconduct.8 The Court
argued that the same rationale applied in Krull to the
legislature because legislators were also detached and were not
direct adjuncts of a law enforcement group. 9
The Court next determined if the exclusion of the evidence
would actually have a deterrent effect." The Court noted that
the greatest deterrent effect on the legislature was the judicial
invalidation of a legislative statute. 1 In using the same
reasoning as Leon, the Court reversed the lower court, applying
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
considered the applicability of the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule to technical defects of warrants in United States v.
Hornick." In Hornick, the issue was whether there was a valid
warrant issued by a Wisconsin judge to Wisconsin state officials
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure94 when a federal agent accompanied state officers in
a search and participated in questioning the defendant.9"
According to the court of appeals, the rule of law regarding
technical defects of warrants was clearly set forth in Leon. "
In its limited analysis, the court adhered to the standard rule
of law and suggested that it would be unlikely that any violation
of Rule 41 would call for suppression except when the Warrant
Clause97 of the Fourth Amendment was offended. 8 Because
multiple remedies were available for violations of federal rules
87. Id. at 350.
88. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916.
89. Krull, 480 U.S. at 350-51.
90. Id. at 351-52.
91. Id. at 361.
92. Id.
93. 815 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1987).
94. Hornick, 815 F.2d at 1158. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. Rule 41 states that
upon request of a federal law enforcement officer, a search warrant authorized by
this rule may be issued by a federal magistrate judge, or state court judge of record
within the federal district, for a search of a person or property that is within a
district. Id.
95. Hornick, 815 F.2d at 1156.
96. Id. at 1158.
97. The Fourth Amendment provides "that no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmations, in particularly describing the
place to be searched." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
98. Hornick, 815 F.2d at 1157. Hornick, the defendant, argued that since a
federal agent participated in the state authorized warrant then a federal warrant
should have also been issued by a federal judge to comply with Rule 41. Id.
Vol. 34:231
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similar to Rule 41, the court did not consider the release of the
defendant.9
In 1990, the issue of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule arose in an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
case, United States v. Curry.'0 ' The question presented in
Curry was whether the evidence obtained during a search was
admissible when, due to an official's clerical error, the warrant
inadequately described the items to be seized.'' The court
examined the issue of whether an objectively reasonable officer
could have relied upon the information in the affidavit. °2 The
court found this case analogous to Sheppard in that the court
applied the Leon exception to evidence seized in conjunction
with a technically defective warrant caused by clerical error.' 3
The affidavit stated that the police had computer printouts of
outgoing phone calls from three hotels involved in a robbery
investigation."' In actuality, the police had printouts from one
hotel, a handwritten record of local phone calls from another,
and notes found in the suspect's room containing phone numbers
of a residence under investigation. 5 The detective who wrote
the warrant admitted to his poor choice of words, but testified
that he tried to the best of his ability to write an accurate
affidavit, and he was in no way attempting to mislead the judge
who issued the warrant.
0 6
The court found that an objectively reasonable officer could
have relied on the information in the affidavit."7 The court
reasoned that the responsibility of the clerical composition of the
warrant was on the issuing authority, and therefore, it was the
judge or magistrate who must review and find any inadvertent
errors or omissions."' This line of analysis led the court to
conclude, in light of the purpose of the exclusionary rule as set
forth in Leon, that the purpose of the rule was not to deter the
actions of judges or magistrates, but rather those of police
officers." The court held that, since the officer acted in an
objectively reasonable manner in applying for a search warrant
99. Id.
100. 911 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1990).
101. Curry, 911 F.2d at 77. The application, due to an issuing official's error,





106. Curry, 911 F.2d at 77.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 77-78.
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and responsibility for the clerical error was born by the
magistrate, the evidence should not have been suppressed."'
The Evans decision was based upon the two major cases
setting forth the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Sheppard and Leon cases were significant developments in
contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Sheppard set
forth an exception to the exclusion of evidence where such
evidence was based upon a facially deficient warrant upon which
an officer reasonably relied."' Leon set forth the same
exception to evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a
warrant which was later found to be lacking probable cause."'
Evans followed the same logic in allowing the admission of
evidence found in a search that resulted from the clerical error
of a judicial employee.' In its analysis, the Court in Evans
looked to the purpose of the exclusionary rule which is to deter
police misconduct."' The analysis set forth by the Court was
based upon the presumption that, in making clerical errors,
court employees are not inclined to purposely violate a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that enforcement of
the exclusionary rule would have no significant effect due to the
employees' indirect stake in the prosecutorial process."' The
release of a criminal due to clerical errors seems hardly a
punishment of court employees.
Another issue raised concerning the exclusionary rule was the
punishing effect on law enforcement officers. In discussing
police officers' conduct, Justice White, in his dissenting opinion
in Stone v. Powell,"6 suggested that the only way the exclusion
of evidence would affect an officers future conduct would be by
making the officer less willing to perform his duties."7 Justice
White's concern was based on the officer's fear that, when
confronted with a similar situation, any effort may proceed to no
110. Id. at 77.
111. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 981. See supra notes 74-80 for a discussion of
Sheppard.
112. Leon, 468 U.S. at 897. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Leon.
113. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1185.
114. Id. at 1193.
115. Id.
116. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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avail due to another actor's incompetence.118 It is a precarious
position to place our law enforcement officers at the day-to-day
mercy of a judicially created exclusionary rule when they are
attempting to ferret out crime from our society.
A similar line of reasoning would apply to a police officer
relying on a judge's or a magistrate's determination of the
existence of probable cause under a particular situation. It is the
judge who is supposed to have the legal acumen to objectively
analyze the facts and render a decision as to the
constitutionality of a search. On a case-by-case basis, the
uniqueness of each situation may also create just as unique
constitutional determinations. Because reasonable minds may
differ as to a determination of probable cause, reasonable minds
may also validly rely on these determinations. Even though a
police officer could not blindly rely on a warrant, it should not be
a law enforcement officer's responsibility to review judicial
determinations."' Certain extreme situations will call for a
police officer to reasonably doubt the validity of the issued
warrant.120
Courts can now examine and observe the difficulty of
implementation of the good faith exception. In some cases, the
factual situations concerning relied upon information is clear
and concise. The mistake in Evans was observed from a police
car's computer terminal where officers consistently sought
information.' The difficulty courts will have is in creating a
test to properly identify a sincere good faith mistake. Courts
must balance the purposes of the good faith exception with the
possible erosion of Fourth Amendment rights due to judicial and
political abuse. The good faith exception cannot become a legal
excuse for police to abuse inalienable rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts must use extreme
discretion when creating and implementing exceptions to the
sole manifestation of American citizens' individual rights.
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